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PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE - JUDGMENT IN ACTION ON
EXPRESS CONTRACT AS RES JUDICATA FOR ACTION ON
IMPLIED CONTRACT - ALTERNATIVE PLEADING
In 1936 plaintiff lost an action on an express contract of partnership,
it being held that there was no partnership contract. Plaintiff now sues
on a quantum meruit theory, for services rendered. Held: that the
judgment in the suit on the partnership contract was res judicata as to
this action.'
The basic problem in this action is whether or not a judgment in
an action on an express contract is res judicata for an action on an
implied contract arising out of the same subject matter. This specific
question of whether actions on express contracts and implied contracts
must be joined in the same action has apparently never been decided
in any previous -Ohio case. Fundamentally, this is a question of the
definition of "cause of action." Should it be used only as it has been
used so far in this note, or should it be given a broader meaning? Do
these two claims represent two different "causes of action" or are they
so nearly alike as to represent but a single "cause of action"? In the
narrow, legalistic, common-law sense they do represent two causes of
action. Legalistically, quantum meruit does differ from express contract.
Yet these claims are so close to each other that as a practical matter of
everyday court practice the question should be raised as to whether or
not there are really two causes of action. The operative facts and the
evidence which plaintiff can produce for either claim are almost identical.
The test of whether the same evidence would sustain both claims has
been called the best and most accurate test of identity of causes of
action.2 Therefore, as a matter of practical judicial policy, it would
be better to treat these two theories as alternate claims which must be
raised in one action. As a result, treating the two claims as containing
only one cause of action, res judicata applies to an attempt to raise either
claim at a latter date.'
Defenders of the narrow view of a cause of action may protest that
plaintiff was denied the opportunity of a full hearing on all of her
'Golden v. Mascari, 63 Ohio App. 139 (1940).
' Ohio Fuel Gas Co. v. Mt. Vernon, 37 Ohio App. i59, 174 N.E. z6o (1930).
'Petersine v. Thomas, zS Ohio St. 596 (876), quoting in effect, Fischli v. Fischli,
I Blackf. (Ind.) 360 (i8z5): "When a matter is inally determined in an action between
the same parties by a competent tribunal, it is to be considered at an end, not only as to
what was determined, but also as to every other question which the parties might have
litigqted ia thp case,"
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claims. Judge Bradbury states the broad policy behind estoppel as a
practical tool of the court.' It is equally applicable to the broader concept
of res judicata:
"Doubtless cases occasionally occur where the estoppel works a
hardship. It must always do that where it in fact prevents the associa-
tion of a just demand or denies the interposition of a meritorious defense;
but these results rarely occur, and where they do occur, they can usually
be traced to the negligence of the party estopped. The possibility of an
occasional advantage unfairly secured by one of the parties to an action
by reason of the rule is indeed a slight evil when compared with the
mischief which would result from its abrogation."
The above discussion sets forth one facet of a problem that has
troubled Ohio courts for many years. Blackburn, in "A1lternative
Pleading in Ohio, ; sets the background for this decision. This back-
ground wvill be sketched briefly in this paragraph. The problem of
alternative pleading arises whenever a party has a case some of the
operative facts of which are beyond his knowledge. The alternative
pleading method is best suited to enable him to set forth his claims,
though often inconsistent ones, and to afford him full relief and justice
in one action. But the Ohio courts have in the past failed to come
to any consistent conclusion as to whether or not alternative pleading
shall be permitted in Ohio. One line of cases upholds the practice.
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. C.N.O. Ry.' permits alternative pleading, saying,
"There is no question that the commissioners who drafted the code,
understood that in a petition under the code there would be, in a case
like this, not two causes of action but one, incorporating in one all the
facts together with a prayer for alternate relief." 7 But another line of
decisions has held that the plaintiff must elect which claim he will
pursue.' Both lines of authority have been followed apparently indis-
criminately up to i919 when the last case in point was decided (of
course excepting the principal case.)'
It might be concluded from the principal case that the court has
finally accepted the alternative pleading theory. But, unfortunately, it
has done so only in a negative manner. The fact that the court never
S3 Ohio St. 361, 369 (iS9).
5 O.S.LJ. 247 (x939).
8 Ohio Dec. Rep. 788, 790, 9 Wkly. L. Bull. 355 (883).
7 See also Citizens Nat'l. Bank v. N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 147,
ri Wkly. L. Bull. 86 (xS84); First Nat'l. Bank v. C. N. B. & T. P. Ry., 9 Ohio Dec.
Rep. 702, x6 Wkly. L. Bull. 399 (iS86).
'Sturges v. Burton, 8 Ohio St. 215, 7z Am. Dec. 5Sz (1858)5 Cincinnati v. Third
Nat'l. Bank, I Ohio C.C. 199, i Ohio C.D. iog (1885 ).
' Harris v. Webb, 2Z Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 359, 31 Ohio Dec. 387, which hewed to the
line of requiring election of one or the other of two inconsistent claims, upon a motion to
make more definite,
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inspects the alternative pleading problem in so many words and therefore
doesn't decisively state the conclusion which tacitly results from the
decision tends to weaken the case as a final solution of that problem.
There is even a slight possibility that the case might be held to establish
a principle requiring an election of pleas rather than alternative pleading
but the wording of the decision would seem to indicate that the court
would have decided in favor of the alternative pleading theory had it
looked the problem squarely in the face. R.L.B.
TRUSTS
TRUSTS - THE OHIO TRUST INVESTMENT STATUTE
The problem of investment in these days of wars, economic de-
pressions, unemployment, and inflation are very real and very present.
The questions of relative security of principal, amount and permanence
of income are considered every day by all classes of investors. The invest-
ing public must be constantly alert to activities in all parts of the nation
and the world which affect the great securities markets. A great silver
shipment from India or China, or a change in the foreign policy of
some distant nation, may, and often does affect the trends of stock,
bond and commodity markets. The "blue chip" of today may be the
"dog on the market" of tomorrow. All these factors and many more
must be reckoned with by the usually careful but poorly informed in-
vesting public. Difficult as the position of the ordinary prudent investor
may be, the position of a trustee, in placing the funds and property in his
care in such manner as to ensure the beneficiaries an adequate income
and at the same time safeguard the principal, is one infinitely more
difficult and precarious. In order to aid the trustee in this matter and
at the same time provide him with some protection, legislatures of many
states have enacted statutes governing types of investments and prescrib-
ing the outer limits as to conduct and discretion.'
These statutes have been of two different types,2 mandatory and
permissive. The mandatory statutes expressly limit the trustee in invest-
ing to the types of securities set out.' Any deviation from this list con-
stitutes a breach of trust. The permissive statute4 is the more usual
treatment and also sets forth categories of permissible investments for a
'See former section Oseo G.c. IZ14. And the present section oSo6-4i.2 Legal Lists in Trust Investment, 49 YALE L.J. 891 (1940) sets out instances of
mandatory and permissive statutes, pages 895-goo.
a See for example IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933 Code Book sec. iS-12o4). "Shall
invest . . . but no other . . . "
'"The trustees may invest . . . ." The Ohio statute o5o6-4i and the former
statute 1214 are also permissive in form.
